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In the early 1990s the World Bank launched the Regional Program on Enterprise 
Development in several African countries, a key component of which was the 
collection of manufacturing firm-level data. In this paper we review the research 
based on the data sets generated by these and subsequent firm surveys in Africa, with 
a special view to what we think are the most important policy implications. We survey 
the research on the African business environment, focusing on market size, risk, 
access to credit, labor, and infrastructure. We cover the research on how firms choose 
to organize themselves and how firms do business. We review the research on firm 
performance, including firm growth, investment and technology acquisition, and 
exports. We conclude with an extended discussion of the policy lessons. 
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•  Between 1972 and 2002 income per capita in Sub-Saharan Africa fell by 8 
percent, from USD 625 to USD 575 in constant 1995 values.  
•  Between 1972 and 2002 manufacturing value-added per capita in Sub-
Saharan Africa fell by 13 percent, from USD 98 to USD 85 in constant 1995 
values.  
•  In 2001/2002 the share of Sub-Saharan African in world population was 11 
percent, the share in world income was 1.1 percent, the share in world 
manufacturing value-added was 0.8 percent, and the share in world 
manufacturing exports was 0.7 percent. 
 




Africa’s poor economic performance is a well established fact. The process of 
globalization, or international economic integration, has largely passed the continent 
by. Foreign investors do not see Africa as a promising location for investment, and 
many Africans share this view and keep a large share of their wealth outside Africa.
2 
The growth of world trade in recent decades has been driven by the increasing 
international outsourcing of production, a process that has made it possible for poor 
countries with relatively unskilled workers to participate in (parts of) high-skill or 
high-tech industries. There has been extensive outsourcing primarily to Asia, but very 
little to Africa. Further, with the exception of Mauritius, Africa’s own manufacturing 
sector is small and stagnant, undertakes little investment, and has not managed to 
break into exports markets. The optimistic beliefs of the 1960s that the sector would 
act as an “engine of growth” in the continent have thus far not been fulfilled.
3  
                                                 
1  World Bank (2004a). 
2 Africans hold 40% of their wealth outside Africa according to Collier, Hoeffler, and Pattillo 
(2001). 
3 Manufacturing is typically far from the largest sector in African economies, nevertheless it 
has often been considered central for economic development. Reasons why the manufacturing 
sector is often perceived as “special” is that this sector is a potential engine of modernization, 
a creator of skilled jobs, and a generator of positive spillover-effects (Tybout, 2000).   2
Over the last 15 years the attitude of policy makers towards manufacturing in 
Africa has changed significantly. The strategy of import substitution, which involved 
protecting the domestic manufacturing sector by means of barriers to imports and 
discouraging exports, was embraced in Africa for a long time and was almost 
certainly part of the reason for the poor economic outcomes. At the center of the 
current policy discussion is the idea that improved economic performance in Africa’s 
private sector can contribute to poverty reduction by generating more well paid jobs. 
Since the early 1990s, large scale data collection projects have been fielded in Africa 
with the objective of generating data on manufacturing firms and plants informative 
of why things had gone wrong in the sector and how matters could be improved. The 
purpose of this paper is to review the findings that have come out of this research with 
a special view to what we think are the most important policy implications. Our 
purpose is thus not to extend the work that has been done but to draw on it to address 
a range of questions relevant to understanding the links from industrial policy to 
poverty reduction.  
We are not the first to take stock of what can be learned from data on 
manufacturing firms in Africa. Tybout (2000) reviews the research on firm 
performance in developing regions, including Africa. Mazumdar and Mazaheri (2003) 
focus exclusively on African manufacturing. Collier and Gunning (1999) discuss the 
problems faced by Africa’s manufacturing sector as part of their survey paper on 
Africa’s general economic problems. All of these studies cover data on African firms 
confined to the period 1991-1995, i.e. the first wave of the RPED data (see Section 2). 
More recently, Kingdon, Sandefur and Teal (2004) and Fafchamps and Söderbom 
(2004a) have provided overviews of the conditions for job creation and labor demand 
in Africa, drawing on the firm surveys among other sources. Our review is based on 
more recent data than what was referred to in Collier and Gunning (1999), Tybout 
(2000), and Mazumdar and Mazaheri (2003), and in looking at a wide range of results 
that have come out of the research on the firm data it has a broader focus than the 
review papers by Kingdon et al. and Fafchamps and Söderbom (2004a).  
  One of the most remarkable characteristics of African economic performance 
is the wide range of outcomes across countries. There exist spectacular success stories 
as well as mediocre economic performers. There are relatively large as well as very 
small economies. There are countries that have experienced drawn out political 
turmoil and others that have seen long-term political stability. There are countries  3
where there is ongoing rapid economic and political change and others that are firmly 
in the status quo category. Sweeping averages of aggregate variables - such as those 
reported above - thus mask an enormous amount of variability in the data. One of the 
recurring themes throughout this paper is that the firm data show a similar pattern of a 
very wide range of outcomes across firms within countries in Africa. While most 
firms have not fared well during the last 10-15 years, some have actually performed 
extremely well. We think this is one of the most striking general results that have 
come out of the work on these data. Because the heterogeneity in outcomes is so 
strong, understanding its causes and consequences is, we think, of central importance. 
To this end, firm data must be available.  
In recent years there has been a rapidly growing interest in documenting 
differences in the “investment climate” across regions and countries, and investigating 
if such differences can be linked to differences in outcomes, both across and within 
countries (e.g. Batra, Kaufmann and Stone, 2003; World Bank, 2004b, 2005).
4 The 
poor investment climate in Africa results in high transaction costs and particularly 
disadvantages the manufacturing sector and its ability to export, as manufacturers are 
intensive users of investment climate services (Collier, 2000). This is problematic, 
because exporting presents a promising route to growth and development in Africa. 
There are two reasons for this. First, the domestic markets for manufactured goods are 
typically very small. African industry must therefore orientate a substantial share of 
its output towards exporting if the sector is to grow, generate new jobs and contribute 
to poverty reduction in the continent. Second, there is evidence from the data that 
firms become more productive as a result of exporting. This is the so-called learning-
by-exporting effect, first documented for Africa by Bigsten et al. (2004) and 
subsequently confirmed on a larger sample by van Biesebroeck (2005a). We will 
return to this below. Since Africa represents only a tiny fraction of world trade the 
potential for expansion is significant, and experience from Ghana and Uganda 
suggests that export recovery can generate large gains quite quickly.  
                                                 
4 The investment climate as a concept is very broad, its key components being the 
institutional, policy, and regulatory environment in which firms operate (Dollar, Hallward-
Driemeier, and Mengistae, 2003). The quality of infrastructure, the nature of business 
regulations and their enforcement, the prevalence of credit constraints, the quality of 
governance, general conditions for private investment and enterprise growth, economic 
freedom, country credit ratings, human development, environmental sustainability and civil 
rights are all examples of recently studied dimensions of the investment climate.  4
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss 
why and how firm survey data are useful in the context of improving our 
understanding of Africa’s manufacturing sector. In this section we also describe 
briefly the main data collection projects that have been fielded in Africa since the 
early 1990s. In Section 3 we review the research results on manufacturing firms in 
Africa. We begin by looking at the business environment, focusing on market size, 
risk, access to credit, labor, and infrastructure. We then turn to issues to do with how 
firms that operate in such an investment climate choose to organize themselves and 
how firms do business. We end the section by looking in some detail at what we have 
learned about three key aspects of firm performance, namely firm growth, investment 
and technology acquisition, and exports. We conclude in Section 4 with an extended 
discussion of the policy lessons.  
 
2.  Why Firm Surveys? 
The main channels through which Africa’s private sector can contribute to poverty 
reduction are by generating wage growth and more jobs. Everything else equal, 
increasing wages and employment result in higher total labor costs, which tend to 
erode firms’ profits unless accompanied by better performance. This is why improved 
economic performance is vital in this context and a major reason why this has come to 
be a central concern to policy-makers and development analysts alike over the last 
decade. The survey data on African firms have been extensively used for research 
under this theme. Over the last ten to 15 years three major research programs can be 
identified - all connected to the World Bank one way or the other - which have 
involved the collection of survey data on African firms on a large scale. The first was 
the Regional Program on Enterprise Development (RPED) surveys, carried out in 
Burundi, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe 
between 1992 and 1995. Each survey typically covered about 200 firms, and firms 
were interviewed three years in a row in most countries (thus yielding panel data). 
Four industrial sub-sectors were covered – food, wood, textiles and metal – and large 
as well as small firms, including informal ones, were included. Data were collected on 
a wide range of variables, including sales and output, capital stock, entrepreneur 
characteristics, employment by occupational category, labor turnover, wages, and 
conflicts with workers. Data collection as part of the RPED slowed down after 1995,  5
and the World Bank subsequently initiated the Firm Analysis and Competitiveness 
Surveys (FACS) as the next large data collection program. The focus of the FACS 
was oriented towards larger firms outside SSA, and Morocco was the only African 
country surveyed as part of FACS.  
At the end of the 1990s and in the early 2000s new survey initiatives took 
place in SSA, as Investment Climate (IC) surveys and the World Business 
Environment Survey (WBES) were fielded across a wide range of countries. The IC 
surveys carried out in SSA so far have been organized as part of the RPED, and have 
covered Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Nigeria, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Côte d'Ivoire, Cameroon, Senegal, and Mauritius. The nature of these 
surveys is similar to the earlier RPED surveys in terms of firm and sector coverage, 
but the survey instruments are more oriented towards investment climate issues and 
thus far the main objective appears to have been to collect cross-section data (as 
distinct from panel data). The WBES was launched in 80 countries and one territory 
in 1999 and 2000, including 17 countries in SSA (Batra, Kaufmann and Stone, 2003). 
The surveys in SSA covered between 52 and 137 firms per country, and both 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms were included. The bulk of the survey 
instrument was concerned with firm and business environment attributes (e.g. 
governance, regulations, economic policy, public services etc.). The WBES data is 
cross-section data. 
The firm survey is not the only way of generating data useful for analysis of 
private sector performance and the role of the investment climate. In fact, because 
many aspects of the investment climate are constant across firms within an economy, 
it will sometimes be better to measure the key dimensions of the investment climate at 
the country level - perhaps by means of a few case studies - and then conduct the 
empirical analysis at the aggregate level. One major project based on such a procedure 
has generated the World Bank and IFC Doing Business Database (World Bank, 
2005). This database contains data on various aspects of the regulatory environment 
facing private firms in a large number of countries and economic regions - e.g. how 
long it takes to start a business, how hard it is to hire and fire workers, how well 
contracts are enforced and so on. The construction of these data is based on case-
studies of laws and regulations in each country and does not involve surveying 
individual firms.   6
While the case-study is a practical approach for collating data on national 
regulations, it is not suitable for measuring all aspects of the investment climate even 
if one’s sole purpose is to create country-level variables. For instance, if one wants to 
know how long it takes on average for imported and exported goods to clear customs 
or how much money firms lose on average due to power outages, a firm survey is 
likely to be the only feasible approach. Further, firm surveys provide probably the 
best (the most representative) basis for reports on “the voices of the firms” (Batra et 
al., 2003) with respect to growth obstacles. The case-study and the firm surveys are 
thus best viewed as complementary methods, generating different kinds of 
complementary information.  
When, then, are firm survey data most useful? We have already mentioned one 
obvious use of firm data, namely to construct aggregate investment climate measures 
(or any aggregate variable, for that matter). In some cases, the researcher’s goal 
cannot be reached by relying on aggregate data. It may be that the researcher has to 
analyze differences across firms within an economy, in order to estimate, say, 
productivity dispersion - a conventional indicator of the degree of competition – or to 
find out whether credit constrained firms invest less than unconstrained ones. It is 
arguably in cases like this, when the heterogeneity across firms is of central interest, 
that firm data is most useful. Unless firm data are already available (which is often not 
the case in SSA), there is then really no substitute for the firm survey.
5 Indeed, 
perhaps the most striking general result that has come out of the work on the African 
firm survey data thus far is that there is substantial heterogeneity in performance 
across firms within countries. For instance, Bigsten et al. (1999a) analyze data on 
manufacturing firms in four African countries and report that for one quarter of the 
firms profit to capital ratios are more than four times lower than the median, while for 
another quarter of the observations profit rates are more than four times higher than 
the median (and this is not a result, primarily, of cross-country differences). A similar 
finding of large variability across firms holds for most of the key performance 
variables in the data (e.g. productivity, export intensity, investment).  
The policy implications of heterogeneity in firm performance are potentially 
far-reaching. For instance, recent research has shown that there are important knock-
on effects on labor market outcomes, which, as discussed above, provides the link 
                                                 
5 Industrial census data may exist but are typically much less detailed than survey data.  7
between firms and poverty. Söderbom, Teal and Wambugu (2005) show that, 
conditional on all observed and unobserved worker skills that are fixed over time, 
workers’ earnings in Ghana and Kenya vary positively with firm size. That is, two 
identical employees who work in identical firms and receive identical wages in year 1, 
will get different earnings in year 2 if the two firms grow at different rates over this 
period. There is thus a direct link from firm performance, and changes in 
performance, to the standards of living of the individuals working in the firms. 
Substantial variability in performance will be associated with large income 
inequalities. Further, a lot of heterogeneity implies that it is quite pointless to talk 
about a “typical”, or “representative”, African manufacturing firm, since the average 
characteristics provide an accurate picture of rather few firms (with the average as the 
benchmark, African firms are typically atypical, as it were). The more heterogeneity, 
the more pertinent are questions relating to the causes and consequences of these 
differences across firms, and so the more pressing is the need for firm data. In our 
review of the research findings in the next section, we will therefore pay special 
attention to this issue. 
One important distinction referring to the structure of data available is whether 
the data are cross-section or panel. The panel data structure – data in which the same 
firms are followed over time - is powerful, essentially because it provides an excellent 
basis for analysis of various aspects of firm dynamics (e.g. productivity growth or 
firm survival) and because it puts the researcher in a much stronger position to draw 
conclusions about causal effects (since time invariant “unobserved heterogeneity” can 
be controlled for). Most of the panel data available on African firms date back to the 
first round of RPED surveys in the early 1990s. These surveys resulted in panel data 
with at most three observations per firm, so these panels are still very short. The 
Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE) at Oxford University has 
organized follow-up surveys designed to lengthen the time dimension of the panels in 
Ghana, Kenya and Tanzania. Currently, the longest panel on African manufacturing 
covers twelve years of data on Ghanaian firms. In recent years, efforts have also been 
made to collate panel data on the individuals working in the firms in these three 
countries. This will enable researchers to better understand the nature of the income 
dynamics of these employees whilst employed, and how their incomes tend to change 
once the employees leave the firm. While the strength of panel data relative to cross-
section data continues to be a matter of (sometimes intense) debate amongst  8
academics, our view is that the potential advantages are too significant to ignore. In 
fact, the result discussed earlier that there is a lot of heterogeneity across firms in 
Africa suggests that the case for panel data is particularly strong for this region. Panel 
data are costly to collect and the “returns” come in the medium and long term, when 
sufficiently long time series have been constructed. Nevertheless, without panel data 
the range of policy questions that analysts can hope to find answers to is inherently 
limited.  
 
3.   What Have We Learned?  
We begin this section with a review of what we have learned from the data about the 
business environment in which African manufacturing firms operate. We focus on 
market size, risk, access to credit, labor, and infrastructure. We then turn to issues to 
do with how firms choose to organize themselves and how firms do business. We end 
the section by looking in some detail at what we have learned about three key aspects 
of firm performance, namely firm growth, investment and technology acquisition, and 
exports.  
 
3.1   The Business Environment 
The business environment has emerged as the prime suspect as to why firm 
performance in Africa is poor, and improving the investment climate is seen as a 
policy priority for the continent (e.g. World Bank, 2004b, 2005). Batra, Kaufmann 
and Stone (2003) analyze the obstacles to business based on the WBES data. The 
leading constraint cited by the company managers in Africa is financing, followed by 
corruption, infrastructure and inflation. Pooling data across all regions, the authors 
find a negative and statistically significant relationship between taxes, regulations and 
financing and the growth in sales and investment.
6  
  One implication of a poor business environment is that the costs for certain 
services important to manufacturers will be high. Eifert, Gelb and Ramachandran 
                                                 
6 Because Batra et al. (2003) include country fixed effects in the regressions, the interpretation of the 
results is that firms that rate the constraints as relatively severe compared to other firms in the same 
country tend to have relatively low growth rates. Thus the results indicate that a good local investment 
climate is good for local business. The results do not tell us whether firms in countries with poor 
average business environment conditions have lower growth rates of sales and investment than firms in 
countries with good average conditions.  9
(2005) show that African firms have high indirect costs - costs for transport, logistics, 
telecom, water, electricity, land and buildings, marketing, accounting, security, bribes, 
etc. – compared to firms in Asia, and that African firms suffer significant losses due to 
power outages, crime, shipment losses etc. Further, the economic risk in Africa is 
typically high, credit is either expensive or not available, skilled labor is relatively 
expensive and domestic markets are typically very small. It seems reasonable to 
suppose that these factors pose significant problems for manufacturers in Africa. In 
this section we review what has been learned from the firm data about these key 




Entrepreneurs in Africa face significant uncertainty with regard to prices (including 
foreign exchange rates), demand, customer payment, reliability of infrastructure, 
corruption and so on. To investigate empirically the effects of risk is difficult, 
however, since risk is not easily measured. A common way of proceeding, especially 
in macroeconomic analysis, is to use some measure of volatility, e.g. in demand or the 
exchange rate. Gunning and Mengistae (2001) argue that this may be misleading, 
since the standard deviation of the exchange rate may not capture the credibility of the 
government’s exchange rate policy. The African firm surveys, however, have 
included questions about expectations for macroeconomic variables (inflation, interest 
rates, exchange rate) and firm variables (employment, output). Firms were asked for 
example about their expectations about the extent of depreciation during the next 12 
months. This kind of data has enabled researchers to get a much better handle on the 
effects of risk on investment. Using data on Ghanaian manufacturing firms, Pattillo 
and Söderbom (2001) find that firms that face a lot of uncertainty regarding future 
demand tend to have lower profit rates than firms facing less uncertainty. The authors 
argue that this is because high risk makes firms choose a conservative product mix 
which has a relatively low expected profit rate. Fafchamps, Gunning and Oostendorp 
(2000) show that Zimbabwean firms respond to risk by increasing their inventories, 
which is another example of how risk results in conservative behavior and additional 
costs. The most commonly cited effect of risk, however, is that on investment. 
Gunning and Mengistae (2001) conclude from their review of the evidence that  10
investments in African manufacturing have been held back by high risk rather than 
low returns on investments. We discuss this in detail in Section 3.4.  
 
ii) Access to credit 
Bigsten et al. (2003) look at formal credit market participation and credit constraints, 
based on survey data on firms in Burundi, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, 
and Zimbabwe observed between 1991 and 1995. The authors use data on firms’ 
demand for external funds and whether loan applications were approved or not. Table 
1, originally Table 2 in Bigsten et al. (2003), displays summary data on the frequency 
of loan applications, and, conditional on an application having been made, the 
outcome. These data suggest the demand for formal loans among African 
manufacturers is low: less than 20 percent of the firms in the sample had applied for a 
formal loan in the year prior to the time of the survey. Among those applying, the 
majority of firms obtain loans. There are large differences across the size distribution: 
among small firms loan applications are less common, and the success rate lower, 
than among larger firms. This is another example of considerable heterogeneity across 
firms. 
 
Table 1. Formal Credit Market Participation by Firm Size (percentages of firms) 
 Micro  Small  Medium  Large  All 
    
Did  not  apply  92 82 80 75 82 
Applied and did not receive  6  11  9  5  8 
Applied and received  2  7  11  20  10 
Source: Bigsten et al. (2003) 
 
A firm may be credit constrained even if it does not apply for a loan. For 
instance, a firm may expect that an application will not be successful precisely 
because there are credit constraints, and may therefore decide not to apply in order not 
to incur the transaction costs. Based on information on why firms did not apply for a 
loan, Bigsten et al. identify three groups of firms: those without credit demand, and, 
among firms with credit demand, those constrained and those unconstrained. Table 2, 
which summarizes these data, shows that 55 percent of the firms in their sample have 
no credit demand, 33 percent are credit constrained, and 12 percent are unconstrained. 
Across the size distribution, the differences are large. Close to two-thirds of the micro  11
firms appear constrained, but only 10 percent of the large firms. About two-thirds of 
the large firms choose not to participate in the credit market, compared to only a third 
of the micro firms. The notion that the smallest firms are credit constrained is 
supported by regression results indicating that, controlling for other important factors 
such as expected profitability and indebtedness, the likelihood of a successful loan 
application varies with firm size. While this suggests banks are biased against small 
firms, the authors note that this result may reflect transaction costs on the part of 
banks. In any case, the size effect is substantial: for a micro firm to have an equal 
chance of getting a loan as a large firm, the micro firm needs to have an average 
return on fixed capital more than 200 percentage points higher than the large firm. 
 
Table 2. Credit Constraints by Firm Size   
  Micro  Small Medium Large  All 
No  credit  demand  33 50 67 66 55 
Demand,  but  rejected*  64 42 21 10 33 
Received loan  3  8  12  23  12 
*Includes firms that suggested that a loan application would be rejected by banks 
Source: Bigsten et al. (2003) 
 
Another novel approach for analyzing the links between formal credit and 
company investment is adopted by Habyarimana (2004) who uses matched bank-firm 
data from Uganda, collected as part of the 2002 RPED, to estimate the effect of losing 
a banking relationship on firm performance. The background to this study is that four 
Ugandan banks were closed between September 1998 and 1999 because of imprudent 
banking practices. As a result, 30 percent of the firms in the sample lost one or several 
banking relationships. Habyarimana estimates that over the three years following the 
banking crisis, the average annual growth rate of employment among firms that lost a 
banking relationship was 2.3 to 4 percent lower than the average growth rate of 
unaffected firms. These estimates are obtained whilst controlling for firm fixed effects 
and time effects that are allowed to differ across sectors. Further, firms affected by the 
banking crises are more likely to report being credit constrained, suggesting that 
losing a banking relationship hampers investment.  
  12
iii) Labor and Skills 
It is a well documented fact that unit labor costs, defined as the total labor costs 
divided by either the value of output or value-added, tend to be higher in Africa than 
in other regions. It has been argued in several Investment Climate Assessments 
(World Bank, 2002; 2004c,d) that high unit labor costs, relative to international 
competitors, imply poor global competitiveness. Eifert, Gelb and Ramachandran 
(2005) have recently challenged this view, citing Eifert and Ramachandran (2004), 
who report that median unit labor costs are lower in Eritrea and Nigeria than in 
Uganda and Mauritius, and Cadot and Nasir (2001) who document higher average 
labor unit costs among firms in China than in Ghana, Lesotho, Madagascar, 
Mozambique and Kenya. The idea that Mauritian firms are less competitive than 
Nigerian ones, or that Chinese firms are less competitive than Ghanaian ones, seems 
counter-intuitive.  
Some basic theory illustrates why it may be problematic to use the unit labor 
cost as a measure of competitiveness. Suppose the firm operates with a Cobb-Douglas 
technology and that factor prices – wages, the cost of capital etc. - are determined 
exogenously.
7 Suppose the firm seeks to minimize costs (or maximize profits), and 
consider the effects of an exogenous increase in the wage rate. Clearly a wage rise 
makes the firm less competitive, and so a useful competitiveness measure should 
reflect this. The theory implies, however, that if the firm can adjust its labor force 
without incurring adjustment costs, it will respond to the wage rise by reducing the 
number of employees by exactly the amount that leaves the unit labor cost unchanged. 
That is, even though the firm is in a weaker position after the wage increase, the unit 
labor cost measure fails to reflect this. An analogous result is obtained for changes in 
total factor productivity or in the demand for the firm’s products. In fact, the only way 
of generating a low unit labor cost in this model is to reduce the output elasticity of 
labor – i.e. make output less  responsive to changes in labor input. It is far from 
obvious that this would be an improvement in terms of competitiveness. The reason 
China has higher labor unit costs than Ghana could thus be that – for technological 
reasons - output is more responsive to labor input in China than in Ghana. This seems 
                                                 
7 The Cobb-Douglas specification, which is extremely popular in applied research, is written 
as  ∑ + =
j j j X A Y ln log log α , where Y  is output or value-added, A  is total factor 
productivity,  j X  is input j and  j α  is the elasticity of Y with respect to  j X .  13
to us more plausible than inferring that Chinese firms are less competitive than 
Ghanaian ones. 
Labor costs, and the supply of labor in general and specific skills in particular, 
are important issues for firm performance and especially for the link between 
performance and poverty reduction. One striking result that has emerged from the 
research on the firm data is how much larger are wages in large than in small firms. 
This is only partly explained by large firms employing more skilled workers than 
small ones. That is, there is a large proportion of the wage differential across firms of 
differing size that is not explained by a differential in skills. Söderbom, Teal and 
Wambugu (2005) show that, conditional on all observed and unobserved worker skills 
that are fixed over time, workers’ earnings in Ghana and Kenya vary positively with 
firm size. The estimated effect is economically large, compared to other regions. In 
the preferred specification for Ghana, the estimated elasticity of wages with respect to 
firm size is 0.15; in Kenya it is 0.08. These numbers imply that as a firm grows from 
having, say, 20 employees to 40, wages will increase by 11 percent in the case of 
Ghana and 6 percent in Kenya.
8 While this might seem like good news for the 
employees, increasing wages results in higher total labor costs which, everything else 
held constant, tend to erode firms’ profits. Improved performance in the form of 
higher productivity would help to countervail this effect. Söderbom and Teal (2004) 
investigate if there is any evidence of increasing returns to scale in Ghanaian 
manufacturing. Under increasing returns to scale, the proportional change in output is 
larger than an equiproportional increase in all inputs (i.e. a doubling of all inputs leads 
to more than a doubling of output, for instance), and so when firms grow higher 
average labor costs would be offset by higher input productivity. Söderbom and Teal 
find, however, only weak evidence for increasing returns and constant returns to scale 
is not rejected. They argue that the reason large firms can remain profitable is that 
they face lower capital costs than small firms. One possible reason for this is better 
access to formal credit.  
  Since rapidly rising labor costs are likely to constrain firm growth and exports, 
it is important to understand why this pattern is observed in the data. The standard 
explanation in the literature why wages are so closely connected to firm size is simply 
that large firms employ individuals that are more skilled than those employed by 
                                                 
8 Ghana: exp(0.15ln(40) – 0.15ln(20)) – 1 = 0.11. Kenya: exp(0.08ln(40) – 0.08ln(20)) – 1 = 0.06.  14
small firms, but as we have seen this does not appear to be the whole explanation for 
the relationship between firm size and wages in Africa. Kingdon et al. (2004) 
distinguish between labor market institutions and intra-firm organizational 
mechanisms as potential explanations for this result and labor market segmentation 
more generally. We summarize their arguments next. 
As for the importance of labor market institutions, Kingdon et al. (2004) cite 
numerous studies providing evidence that unions play a central role in many African 
labor markets. The authors report estimates of the union premium ranging from 3 to 
28 percent in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa and Tanzania, controlling for 
observed worker skills. The authors acknowledge, however, that systematic 
identification of the union effect is complicated by the factor that unionization is 
highly correlated with other leading explanations for labor market distortions 
including other regulations, monopoly power of producers, and firm size more 
generally. A related possible explanation is that there is rent-sharing as a result of a 
bargaining process between the firm and the workers. The idea is that when business 
is good the workers manage to bid up their wages by threatening to walk out if the 
firm refuses to accommodate their demands. Evidence of such rent-sharing effects on 
wages has been found for Ghana (Teal, 1996) and Zimbabwe (Velenchik, 1997).  
It is also possible large firms pay relatively high wages in order to provide 
workers with incentives to exert effort as in efficiency wage models. Fafchamps and 
Söderbom (2004b) derive a theoretical model in which the size-wage relationship is 
generated by the cost of monitoring workers rising with firm size. Using worker-firm 
matched data across 10 African countries, and contrasting SSA with Morocco, their 
estimates indicate that a doubling in the number of production workers will increase 
the labor cost per unit of effort by 9 percent for Morocco and between 11 and 14 
percent for SSA. This is the penalty large firms have to incur in order to motivate 
workers. This incentive problem appears to be more severe in SSA than in Morocco. 
The authors further find that an increase in total factor productivity leads to an 
increase in worker effort in Morocco but a decrease in SSA. High TFP firms in SSA 
hire fewer workers and supervisors (and produce less output) relative to what they 
would have done if the incentive structure had been similar to that in Morocco. 
Quantitatively, this effect on output is large: an increase in TFP by 1 percent increases 
output by 2.9 percent in Morocco but only by 1.3 percent in SSA. This is because a 
high TFP firm in SSA finds it more difficult than in Morocco to manage and supervise  15
its labor force so as to increase or maintain effort. The implications for firm growth 
are thus potentially quite significant. 
The importance of labor market institutions relative to intra-firm 
organizational mechanisms, in terms of their effects on wage, is hard to assess based 
on the available research. What we do know is that the effects are economically large. 
In the case of Ghana, for instance, Söderbom and Teal (2004) estimate that if a firm 
with 350 employees faced the same wage as a firm with 20 employees, total costs in 
the large firm would fall by 20-25 percent. 
 
iv) Infrastructure 
Based on several studies of growth determinants in Africa, Collier and Gunning 
(1999) argue that poor infrastructure is a serious constraint to growth in the continent. 
Compared to other regions public expenditure as a share of GDP has been higher in 
Africa, while service provision has been worse. The poor infrastructure in Africa is 
likely to be a particularly severe constraint to manufacturing growth. Many firms 
spend own resources directly on buying infrastructure services or providing it on their 
own. One reason for the prevalence of small manufacturing firms in Africa (see 
below) is that the transport infrastructure is poorly developed, which creates pockets 
of demand that tend to generate small-scale localized producers. To be able to take 
advantage of international trading opportunities and to engage actively in the 
emerging system of outsourcing requires reliable and cheap infrastructure. Poor 
infrastructure thus presents a significant problem for exporters. 
The firm surveys have generated a lot of information about how firms perceive 
infrastructure problems and recently also about time and monetary costs of different 
bottlenecks. Bigsten et al. (1999b) show that attempts to use data on perceptions to 
explain productivity is problematic. It is shown that the firms that rank infrastructure 
problems as very severe are at the same time the most productive ones. This is due to 
the fact that these are the firms that sell on larger markets and they are thus more 
dependent on the infrastructure. The use of objective measures – e.g. days in customs, 
days without telephone connections, days without electricity etc. - is a more 
promising approach, but so far little analysis is available on the impact of 
infrastructure on manufacturing firm productivity. 
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3.2  Organization and “Doing Business” 
The most conspicuous characteristic of Africa’s manufacturing sector is the 
preponderance of very small and informal firms, which operate side by side with a 
small number of large-scale factories. There is talk of a “missing middle” in the size 
distribution, i.e. that there are very few medium-sized firms. Commonly proposed 
explanations why the manufacturing sector has this structure links directly to the 
business environment discussed above. One seemingly plausible reason is that small 
firms do not want to grow in order to avoid excessive regulation, and 
underdevelopment spawns small firms because Engel effects skew demand towards 
simple items (baked goods, apparel, basic furniture etc.) In Box 1 we summarize 
informally the pros and cons of informal firm status. Bigsten, Kimuyu and Lundvall 
(2004) investigate if there are productivity differentials between formal and informal 
firms in Kenya, where the bulk of manufacturing employment is in the informal 
sector. The authors find no significant productivity difference between small informal 
and formal African owned firms. They also note that formal firms in Kenya have 
experienced significant problems in dealing with authorities relating to regulatory red 
tape, corruption, and lack of security. In a similar vein, Sleuwaegen and Goedhuys 
(2002) report that the proportion of firms that perceive regulations as an obstacle to 
growth is lower in the informal than the formal manufacturing sector in Côte d’Ivoire 
(the opposite is true for market conditions). With cost increases and no productivity 
gains from becoming formal, it may thus be rational for the African entrepreneurs to 
choose to start or remain informal. This is a problem, because in the informal sector 
there is little investment, little exporting, low wages and miniscule contributions to 
tax revenues. There is therefore a case for designing policies that aim to make 
informal firms absorbed into the formal sector. We return to this in Section 4.  17
 
Box 1: Why are most of Africa’s firms informal? 
 
African economies have a very large share of informal manufacturing employment, and the 
informal firms have a vital role to play in the short term be providing a livelihood to a large 
number of people. Informality offers several benefits to the entrepreneur. Management 
requirements are less demanding and government policies and regulations, such as labor laws 
concerning minimum wages and workers’ safety, can be circumvented. Informal firms need 
not adhere to working hour regulations and informal entrepreneurs may find it easier to 
control labor, and they can avoid taxes and fees as well as various urban planning regulations. 
There are also other regulations such as price controls, licensing, and laws pertaining to 
property rights that informal firms can avoid. When there are fluctuations in demand, an 
informal firm finds it easier to adjust because of its simple and flexible technology, and hence 
it can avoid some of the costs associated with idle capacity. The ease with which an informal 
firm can vary its employment level can save on wage costs. 
These advantages must be weighted against the costs and risks associated with 
operating outside the rule of law. Informal firms risk being detected and punished for 
operating ‘illegally’. They also receive fewer services from the state, most notably from 
institutions providing jurisdictional services such as protection against burglars and other 
policing, as well as contract enforcement. The informal firms may be unable to use formal 
channels of dispute resolution due to their uncertain legal status, and this also means that it is 
hard to get access to financial, banking, and other commercial services. Informal 
entrepreneurs cannot get access to trade fairs or use membership in umbrella organizations to 
their benefit. Small firms also tend to have few assets that can be foreclosed in the event of 
breaches of contract, and their transactions are so small that the monetary and time costs 
associated with court actions would not be justified in any case. 
 
 
The business environment also impacts on how firms do business. Widespread 
market failures imply that firms face a lot of “holes” in important markets, such as 
those for insurance and credit. This is especially pronounced for the smallest firms. 
Fafchamps (2001) identifies two types of responses that aim to reduce the resulting 
transaction costs, namely development of relationships and the sharing of information 
within networks. Essentially, when search and verification costs are high, it makes 
sense to try to establish long-term relationships and share information with other 
market participants, in order to economize on such costs. The firm data have been 
extensively used to shed light on these mechanisms. 
Trade credit is a good example of how supplier relationships can be utilized to 
fill in some of the holes in the formal credit market. Fisman (2001) argues that trade 
credit plays an important role in firm financing in Africa, mainly by enabling firms to 
manage raw material inventories more efficiently and by reducing the likelihood of 
raw material shortages. Trade credit may therefore contribute to higher productive 
efficiency. Fisman analyses these issues using the first waves of RPED data from  18
Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. In these data, trade credit is 
the dominant form of payment to suppliers for about a third of the firms. There is 
much variation across countries, however: in Tanzania, trade credit is the dominant 
form of payment for only 8 percent of the firms; in Zimbabwe the corresponding 
figure is 69 percent. Trade credit appears to be more important in countries where the 
average firm size is relatively high, suggesting that large firms are more likely to use 
trade credit than small ones. In the formal empirical analysis, Fisman finds that firms 
that use supplier credit have higher capacity utilization, and are less likely to have raw 
material stockouts, than firms that do not use trade credit. Further, he finds that these 
results are particularly strong among firms that are characterized as “constrained” in 
their access to formal credit. These results are robust to potential endogeneity of 
supplier credit, which may arise if firms use trade credit as a result of having high 
capacity utilization and/or substantial inventories, for instance.  
Fisman (2001) suggests that these results imply that there may be significant 
productivity gains from an increase in the availability of supplier credit. He also 
makes the point, however, that unless we understand why some firms have access to 
credit while others do not, it will be difficult to provide solid advice to policy makers. 
The basic reason is that if lack of access to trade credit is driven by market failures – 
perhaps in the form of lack of public information on credit worthiness or poor contract 
enforcement – then policy measures designed to fix these problems would probably 
have the desired results; but if firms do not get trade credit because they are 
unreliable, pose a big credit risk, don’t want any etc., then it is not clear that 
improving access should be a policy priority. Fisman and Raturi (2004) investigate if 
various firm and entrepreneurial characteristics affect the likelihood that firms in 
Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe get trade credit. The main focus of 
this analysis is to see if trade credit is more common among firms that purchase inputs 
from suppliers that face a lot of competition. The authors find this to be the case, and 
interpret this finding as evidence that suppliers operating in a competitive market use 
credit as a means of creating buyer loyalty. The authors argue that this is consistent 
with a situation in which firms who want trade credit must establish credit worthiness, 
and because of information imperfections, they must do so every time they switch to a 
new supplier. This form of market failure thus creates rents for the suppliers and  19
increases costs for the manufacturers.
9 A related result is that documented by 
Fafchamps (2000), indicating that Asian and European entrepreneurs have better 
access to trade credit than entrepreneurs of African origin. His hypothesis is that this 
is due to ethnic networking in contract enforcement. Fisman (2000) provides similar 
results for Tanzania and Zambia. 
While we may not have a complete picture as to why firms get trade credit, 
this research does suggest that strengthening credit market institutions may be 
important. In the specific context considered by Fisman and Raturi, the policy 
implication is that establishing efficient credit-rating agencies that keep a record of 
companies’ credit histories would erode the de facto monopoly power of the suppliers 
and so lead to lower costs for manufacturers. 
The most common information sharing mechanism is the referral system, 
where a customer or supplier approaches an economic agent with a recommendation 
from a joint acquaintance. When businessmen engage in shared social activities, the 
likelihood of finding common acquaintances increases as does the shared information. 
Well-connected agents are more likely to trade among themselves, since they can 
easily find and screen each other. Group membership thus provides network 
externalities and a competitive edge. Barr (2002) has shown that, in Ghana, there are 
two types of networks. The first is large and diverse, improving entrepreneurs’ access 
to information and opportunities. Barr refers to this as an innovation-network. It is 
mainly enterprises with access to formal institutions, employing more advanced 
technologies and serving more diverse markets that benefit from such networks. The 
second type is a strong, dense, ethnically homogeneous local network, which mainly 
helps reduce uncertainty, but does not improve productivity. This is what is referred to 
as a solidarity network. The firms involved in this type of network are typically 
without access to formal institutions, employ simple technologies, and serve less 
diverse markets. 
 
                                                 
9 Further, there is evidence that ethnicity plays a role for whether firms use trade credit or not 
(Fisman, 2003). This too may be consistent with information imperfections.  20
3.3 Firm  Growth 
Without growth, the contribution of the manufacturing sector to economic 
development and poverty reduction will be modest. The firm surveys have taught us a 
lot about why some firms grow and other do not. From a policy point of view, a better 
understanding of the relationships between growth and certain firm characteristics is 
important, since it can offer guidance as to what type of firms are likely to be 
relatively successful and good at creating jobs in the future. Identification of such 
firms would clearly be informative to policy makers. The relationship between firm 
size and growth is of particular interest in the context of African manufacturing, since 
most firms in Africa are very small. How realistic is it to hope that some of these 
firms will grow and become successful large firms in the future? The relation between 
firm age and growth is also important. For example, if young firms grow quickly, 
policy measures aimed at encouraging entry may have significant growth effects in 
the short and medium term. 
  Ramachandran and Shah (1999) analyze firm growth (in terms of 
employment) in a RPED-sample of firms from Kenya, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and 
Tanzania. They draw on the learning model proposed by Jovanovic (1982), modeling 
firm growth as a function of firm age and firm size variables, plus various variables 
for entrepreneurial characteristics. They find that firm size and firm age are negatively 
correlated with firm growth. Sleuwaegen and Goedhuys (2002) obtain a similar result 
for firms in Côte d’Ivoire, as do Mazumdar and Mazaheri (2003) based on a pooled 
sample from Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. Thus, the finding common across these studies is that growth is 
systematically higher among small and young firms than among large and old firms.  
The negative relationship between size and growth suggests an important role 
for small firms in the development process, in that this is where we should expect to 
see most of the growth. It is important to recognize that this result may be spurious, 
however. The problem, dubbed by Davis, Haltiwanger and Shuh (1996) as the “The 
Regression Fallacy”, arises whenever there are transitory fluctuations in size or 
whenever there are transitory measurement errors in observed size. The resulting bias 
in the estimated relationship between initial size and growth is negative, hence failure 
to address this problem can produce a picture of the growth of small firms that is too 
good. In view of this, the conclusion drawn by Sleuwaegen and Goedhuys (2002) that  21
the “…the results go against Gibrat’s law of random growth behaviour” may be 
premature. One way of dealing with the problem, proposed by Davis et al., is to use as 
a measure of firm size the average size over the observed period(s), rather than the 
initial size. Adopting this procedure, Mazumdar and Mazaheri (2003) present 
descriptive statistics indicating at most a weak negative relationship between size and 
growth in Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
Harding, Söderbom and Teal (2004) use average instead of initial size in regressions 
modeling firm and productivity growth over a five-year period in Ghana, Kenya and 
Tanzania. They find no evidence that either form of growth is systematically linked to 
firm size. 
In reality the growth process is complex and it is possible that regressions in 
which growth is modeled as a linear function of initial size and age, along with a set 
of control variables, may be too restrictive. Sleuwaegen and Goedhuys (2002) 
acknowledge this and consider the role played by terms non-linear in size and age in 
the growth regressions. They find strong evidence of a positive interaction effect 
between age and size on growth. This result implies that, everything else equal, the 
relationship between age and growth is less negative (or more positive) for large firms 
than for small firms, and that the relationship between size and growth is less negative 
(or more positive) for old firms than for young ones. To facilitate interpretation of the 
results we show in Figure 1 predicted size as a function of initial size and age, based 
on the estimates reported in Sleuwaegen and Goedhuys (2002), Table 3, column 1. All 
factors except age and initial size are held constant. We consider a small firm (initial 
size 10 employees), a medium sized firm (100 employees) and a large firm (200 
employees), and for reference we set the constant in the model to the value that 
generates zero growth over 30 years for the medium sized firm. The small firm has 
high growth rates initially and after 10 years it has grown from 10 to 30 employees. 
The growth rates fall over time, however, and eventually this firm starts to contract. 
For the large firm the pattern is the opposite. Employment falls rapidly in the initial 
years of operation but after 10-15 years the favorable age effect – i.e. the positive the 
interaction effect between size and age - kicks in and the firm starts to grow. Small 
and large firms thus have very different growth patterns: growth is observed among 
the initially small and young firms and among initially large and old firms.
10 These 
                                                 
10 Notice that results may not be robust to the regression fallacy problem discussed above.  22
results square with descriptive statistics indicating that few small firms ever grow up 
to become large (Biggs, Ramachandran and Shah, 1999, cited in Biggs and Shah, 
2003).  
 

























Initial Size: 50 Initial Size: 10 Initial Size: 150
Note: The predictions were generated based on the estimates reported in Sleuwaegen and 
Goedhuys (2002), Table 3, column 1. Specifically, we calculate total growth after AGE years 
using the formula  () ()
AGE g ˆ exp , where 
( ) ( ) SIZE AGE SIZE SIZE AGE g ln ln 041 . 0 ln 006 . 0 ln 199 . 0 ln 157 . 0 ˆ
2 + + − − =α ,  
and α is a constant set to a value that implies that the firm with initial size 100 will have the 
same size after 30 years. We then multiply initial size by  ( ) ( )
AGE g ˆ exp  to give predicted size 
after AGE years. 
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Firm characteristics other than size and age have been shown to matter for 
firm growth as well. Ramachandran and Shah (1999) find that firms controlled by 
minority entrepreneurs, Asian or European, did better than those controlled by 
indigenous entrepreneurs.
11 Secondary and university education are highly significant 
and positive for African entrepreneur while none of the entrepreneurial variables were 
significant in the non-African model. Their interpretation of these results is that non-
Africans benefit from various advantages of being a minority such as access to 
informal networks, credit, informal contractual mechanisms etc. Networks that 
provide contractual mechanisms for access to credit, information and other inputs are 
beneficial for growth. For the African entrepreneurs education may serve as a 
substitute for access to these networks. Mengistae (1999) uses data from Ethiopian 
manufacturing firms to analyze whether there also are differences between indigenous 
ethnic groups. Controlling for the date of start-up, sector, time of observation, the 
education and prior experience of the entrepreneur, and unobserved establishment 
effects he finds that there is one group in Ethiopia that stands out, namely the Gurage. 
They started up larger and grew faster. Surprisingly enough the Gurage were the least 
educated ethnic group and also had least vocational training. 
Related to the issue of firm growth is firm survival. Exit rates in African 
manufacturing are significant, and highest among the smallest firms (Söderbom, Teal 
and Harding, 2004; Van Biesebroeck, 2005b). The study by Söderbom et al. focuses 
on the role of total factor productivity in determining whether or not firms survive. 
The authors use a pooled panel data set of firms in Ghana, Kenya and Tanzania that 
spans a period of five years. They find that productivity impacts on firm survival 
among large, but not small, firms. Figure 2, taken from their paper, illustrates this 
finding. Standardizing productivity by the sample mean, the graph shows that exit 
rates among firms with 10 employees are relatively high and almost wholly invariant 
to productivity. In other words, being relatively productive does not prevent firms 
from going out of business if they are small. Among larger firms, however, exit rates 
do depend on productivity, which is consistent with a “survival-of-the-fittest” process, 
                                                 
11 An early study into the relation between minorities and entrepreneurial success is that by 
Kilby (1983). The author argues that minority entrepreneurs often have superior initial 
endowments of capital, knowledge of markets and technology and have acquired traditions 
that help them raise productivity. The environment has also forced them to cooperate with 
fellow minority entrepreneurs, with whom they have built networks of trust that provides 
information, risk-spreading arrangements, favorable terms of credit and a larger pool of 
individuals to whom managerial responsibilities can be delegated.  24
documented in the U.S., the UK and a number of middle income countries. While the 
latter result is positive, in the sense that churning contributes to aggregate productivity 
gains for this category of firms, it must be borne in mind that most firms in Africa are 
very small. If small and productive firms could grow, this would have dramatic effects 
on their survival rates and therefore on aggregate productivity. 
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Note: The horizontal axis is interpretable as the percentage deviation in total factor productivity from 
the sample mean. The graph thus shows how exit rates change as total factor productivity changes from 
75 percent of the sample mean to 125 percent of the sample mean. 
Source: Söderbom, Teal and Harding, 2004. 
 
Although we have learned a lot from the firm data about several aspects of 
firm growth, more research is needed in this area. There is still uncertainty as to the 
nature of the association between firm size and growth in African manufacturing. It 
may be that growth rates are in fact independent of firm size, in which case policy 
makers should not expect systematically higher growth rates in certain size segments 
of the sector. In order to address the methodological challenges that we have 
discussed it will be necessary to use data in which firms are observed over a relatively  25
long period of time. Access to panel data with a reasonably long time dimension is 
therefore important. Further, whether the fact that small and relatively productive 
firms have high exit rates is a cause for concern depends on why this result is 
observed. It would be socially wasteful if exit were in some sense involuntary, e.g. 
due to some uninsurable and temporary shock. However, if exit is “voluntary”, e.g. 
because the entrepreneur has found a more profitable occupation elsewhere, then it is 
less clear that this is a problem. Probing these issues further may be an interesting 
area for future research. 
 
3.4  Investment and Technology Transfer 
In this section we review the evidence on what factors constrain investment and 
technology acquisition in Africa’s manufacturing sector. We begin with a discussion 
of the important issue of financial constraints and assess the empirical support of the 
common notion that such constraints have acted as a major impediment for 
investment in Africa. We then proceed to studies that have considered the effects of 
risk on investment. We finally discuss ways of obtaining better technology other than 
investment in fixed capital. 
African financial markets are the least developed in the world, and it has long 
been a widespread view among development economists that this hampers growth. 
For investment, the main problem is that firms with profitable investment projects 
often cannot use external funds to finance such projects. Commonly cited reasons for 
financial imperfections are imperfect information, cumbersome contract enforcement 
and lack of competition among lenders. 
  That there are financial imperfections in Africa is not in dispute, however such 
imperfections will not translate into binding constraints unless firms have a desire to 
invest. Thus, if there are few profitable investment opportunities one would not expect 
lack of credit to be a real constraint on investment. One corollary is that one would 
not expect reforms of the financial market to lead to significant short-run positive 
effects on company investment in a period of recession. One of the first studies 
analyzing whether investment among African firms is hampered by lack of external 
finance is that by Bigsten et al. (1999a). These authors test whether investment is 
sensitive to changes in cash flow among firms in four African countries. The evidence 
indicates that there is a significant profit effect on investment, which suggests that 
credit constraints are present. With point estimates on the profit term ranging between  26
0.06 and 0.10, the magnitude of the effect is small, however: only between six and ten 
cents of an additional dollar earned in profits are invested.  
Subsequent research based on RPED data confirms that investment is not 
particularly sensitive to changes in profits. In an in-depth analysis of the 
manufacturing sector in Zimbabwe 1992-94, Fafchamps and Oostendorp (1999) show 
that the cash-flow sensitivity of investment is low, even among small firms. 
Söderbom (2002) obtains a similar result for Kenya. Mazumdar and Mazaheri (2003) 
use a sample of six countries (adding Côte d’Ivoire and Zambia to the set of countries 
considered by Bigsten et al., 1999a), and report an estimated profit coefficient is 0.08, 
thus very similar to that of Bigsten et al. Mazumdar and Mazaheri also split the 
sample according to firm size, and obtain a profit coefficient equal to 0.09 in the sub-
sample of small firms. They interpret the larger profit coefficient among small firms 
as evidence that small firms are more credit constrained than large ones. Reinikka and 
Svensson (2001) obtain a profit coefficient equal to 0.08 based on a sample from 
1996-97 of Ugandan manufacturing firms. These authors too find a larger profit effect 
among smaller firms, which is consistent with the notion that credit access is more of 
a problem for small firms. The point estimate of the coefficient on profits among 
small firms is 0.11, and so quantitatively the effect is not particularly large even for 
small firms.  
Now consider the effect of uncertainty on investment. There is hardly any 
second-hand market for used machinery in Africa, which means that investments 
largely have to be treated as sunk cost (i.e. they are “irreversible”). This is 
problematic in an environment where uncertainty about future rules of the game as 
well as market development is a standard feature. Theories of irreversible investment 
under uncertainty predict that investment will be slower to respond to demand shocks 
if uncertainty is relatively high. As mentioned in Section 3.1 testing empirically for 
the effects of risk is difficult, as risk is not easily measured. In this context, the design 
of innovative survey questions has been a major step forward. Pattillo (1998) uses 
panel data on Ghanaian manufacturing firms from 1994 and 1995 to test various 
hypotheses from models of irreversible investment under uncertainty. Based on data 
on entrepreneurs’ subjective probability distribution over future demand, Pattillo 
calculates the variance of demand and uses this as the measure of uncertainty. 
Empirical results indicate that uncertainty has a negative effect on investment and this 
effect is more pronounced for firms with more irreversible investment. A similar  27
inquiry is undertaken by Darku (2001) based on firm-level data from a survey in 
Uganda in 1998. Constructing the measure of uncertainty in the same way as Pattillo 
(1998), Darku finds a negative relationship between uncertainty and investment, and 
documents that this effect is stronger among firms with more irreversible investment. 
These studies provide direct evidence that the effect of uncertainty on investment is 
negative.  
High uncertainty results in a high risk premium in the required return on 
invested capital, suggesting that African manufacturing firms have high opportunity 
costs of capital. Bigsten et al. (1999a) argue that this is indeed the case. Using RPED 
data from Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya and Zimbabwe from the early and mid 1990s, 
Bigsten et al. report figures on average returns on capital that are much higher than 
among firms in more developed countries. This is clear from Table 3, which shows 
some of the figures reported in Bigsten et al, along with data from Uganda, taken from 
Reinikka and Svensson (2001). While there is a striking similarity in the average 
investment rates across all countries considered, the rates of returns on capital are 
much higher in Africa than in the European countries. The authors infer from this that 
the cost of capital is relatively high in Africa, and maintain that this is consistent with 
a negative effect of uncertainty on investment. A similar view is taken by Fafchamps 
and Oostendorp (1999), arguing that uncertainty is a plausible explanation as to why 
investment has remained low in Zimbabwe despite of the structural changes 
introduced by ESAP. 
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Table 3. Investment rates and returns on fixed capital in eight countries 
 Investment  rate 
Average return on fixed 
capital 
    
Cameroon 0.11  1.36 
Ghana 0.13  3.63 
Kenya 0.11  1.82 
Uganda 0.12 0.75 
Zimbabwe 0.12  0.85 
    
Belgium 0.13  0.18 
France 0.11 0.12 
Germany   0.12  0.16 
UK 0.12  0.13 
    
Source: The data on all countries except Uganda were reported in Bigsten et al. 
(1999a). The Ugandan data were reported in Reinikka and Svensson (2001).  
 
Using the same data set as in their 1999 study with Zambia added, Bigsten et 
al. (2005) examine more closely if investment is affected by irreversibility and fixed 
adjustment costs. In such models firms will not invest anything unless the marginal 
return on capital exceeds some threshold level, and so one would expect to see a 
significant share of zero investments in the data if the theory is right. Table 4, taken 
from Bigsten et al. (2005), summarizes the proportions of non-zero investments in this 
data set by country and firm size. With the exception of Zimbabwe, in all countries 
and size categories the proportion of positive investment is lower than 0.5. That is, the 
majority of the firms in these categories do not invest anything during a whole year. 
There is a weak positive relationship between firm size and the propensity to invest, 
although among the largest firms in Ghana only one in five firms invest in a 
representative year. In Zimbabwe investment activity is generally higher than in the 
other countries. With a third of the firms in the whole sample refraining from 
investing in a typical year, however, the proportions of zero investment is not 
negligible. The authors also show that investment is “lumpy”, i.e. whenever firms do 
invest they invest a lot. This suggests that fixed adjustment costs may be important. 
However when analyzing the decision to invest more formally, the evidence points to 
irreversibility as the main explanation of low investment in Africa. Reducing 
uncertainty, or improving the market for second hand fixed capital, is therefore likely 
to impact positively on investment.   29
 
Table 4. Proportions of Non-Zero Investments Among Firms in Six African 
Countries 
Employment Cameroon  Ghana  Kenya  Uganda  Zambia Zimbabwe
    
1≤ ≤5  0.21 0.31 0.44 n.a. 0.29 0.53 
    
5< ≤20  0.29 0.44 0.40 n.a. 0.29 0.51 
        
20< ≤100  0.24 0.48 0.41 n.a. 0.28 0.63 
    
>100  0.38 0.20 0.44 n.a. 0.38 0.71 
        
Total  0.29 0.32 0.42 0.52 0.31 0.66 
        
Note: The table is based on data from a sample of 821 firms.  
Source: Bigsten et al. (2005).  
 
One of the main objectives of carrying out investment is to get access to better 
technology. There are other ways by which African firms can access better 
technology, however. Foreign direct investment (FDI) can lead to transfers of 
technology if multinational enterprises transfer technological information to their 
subsidiaries. Firms that export learn about general conditions and available 
technology in the international market. Technology licensing arrangements can be 
established to transfer technology directly. However, so far direct transfers of 
technology via technology-contracts and the like to African manufacturing firms have 
been very limited (see e.g. Bigsten and Kimuyu, 2002, on Kenya). Because of this, 
trade or FDI are potentially important channels for technology transfers in Africa. 
While there is fairly strong evidence that African firms become more productive as a 
result of exporting (see Section 3.5), we do not yet know if this is due primarily to 
technological innovations, exposure to foreign competition, or something else. In any 
case, for technology transfers to be effective firms must be able to absorb the 
technology. This will be facilitated by the existence of an intellectual infrastructure 
such as laboratories and universities. Also required is an ability to adapt imported 
technology to local circumstances (Tybout, 2000). Why technology transfer to 
Africa’s manufacturing sector is slow is as yet unclear. However, it would not seem 
unreasonable to assume that market failures play a role. Asymmetric information, for 
instance, makes it hard for buyers to asses the value of technological information.   30
The general picture that emerges from the research on investment in African 
manufacturing is one where uncertainty has played a big role whereas credit might not 
have been a severe constraint. There is some evidence that lack of credit has been a 
problem for small firms, but although the profit effect on investment is larger for 
small than large firms (Reinikka and Svensson, 2001), it is still small by the standards 
of what has been reported for other regions. The analysis of firms’ borrowing 
behavior by Bigsten et al. (2003), reviewed in Section 3.1, points to a similar picture: 
on average the desire for formal credit has been relatively modest, although among 
very small firms there is relatively high demand for credit. The most likely 
explanation why credit (or the lack of credit) has not been a major factor in explaining 
why investment has been low over the last decade is that during this period few firms 
in these countries could identify strong investment opportunities. This does not mean 
that the reforms of the financial systems implemented in many African countries in 
the 1990s were unnecessary. The reason these reforms have appeared ineffectual thus 
far is that the constraints that were relaxed as a result were in fact not binding at the 
time. When firms expand the need for formal borrowing will increase, and the 
financial reforms may turn out to have a higher pay-off when this happens. However, 
with hindsight it could be argued that priority should have been given in the 1990s to 
facilitating exports and productivity growth over credit.  
 
3.5   Exports  
We have already touched upon the issue that manufacturing firms in Africa operate in 
small domestic markets. In order to expand production, firms must therefore orientate 
part of their production towards exporting. Two issues then arise. First, what are the 
factors that prevent African firms from entering the exports market? The answer to 
this question will shed light on how policy can be designed to facilitate entry to the 
international market. Secondly, are there any benefits, other than market enlargement, 
associated with exporting? In answering this question we focus on the notion that 
firms may become more productive as a result of contacts with foreign customers and 
pressure to be internationally competitive.  
  One can identify at least two key factors that determine whether a firm will 
participate in the exports market: the level of the entry barrier, and the cost efficiency 
of the potential exporter. In their influential paper on the decision to export, Roberts 
and Tybout (1997) stress that it is likely to be quite costly for a firm to enter the  31
exports market for the first time. For instance, it may be necessary for the exporting 
firm to set up a marketing department to investigate marketing channels, meet export 
orders etc. It also seems likely that the quality of the investment climate has a bearing 
on the magnitude of entry costs, but we have no rigorous empirical evidence to 
support this assertion. While entry costs are typically not observed, Roberts and 
Tybout argue that indirect evidence of costly entry can be obtained by testing for an 
effect of previous exports status on current status. The idea is that, in the absence of 
entry costs, firms will switch in and out of the exports market independently of 
whether they have exported in the past. If there are significant entry costs, however, 
then firms that have incurred these costs in the past (and thus will not have to incur 
them again) will be more likely to export in subsequent periods than firms that have 
not, simply because exporting is less costly for the insiders than for the outsiders. In 
their empirical application, which is based on data on manufacturing plants in 
Colombia, Roberts and Tybout find strong evidence that insiders are more likely to 
export than outsiders. This indicates that entering the exports market is associated 
with significant fixed costs.  
Bigsten et al. (2004) carry out a similar analysis based on firm-level RPED 
data from Ghana, Cameroon, Kenya and Zimbabwe from the early 1990s. Controlling 
for a number of other factors including firm specific time invariant heterogeneity, they 
find that past export status has a significant effect on the propensity to export. The 
magnitude of this effect is large: for the “average” firm that did some exporting in the 
previous period, the likelihood of exporting in the current period is about 0.57 while 
the likelihood of exporting for an otherwise identical firm that did not export in the 
previous period is 0.18. Thus, for a non-exporting firm with the average 
characteristics, entering the export market raises the probability that this firm will 
export in the next period from less than one in five to more than one half. This is the 
effect of entry costs. Van Biesebroeck (2005a) obtains a similar result on a larger 
sample of nine SSA countries. There are at least two important policy implications. 
First, if incentives can be created for firms to enter the exports market, they are likely 
to remain in the exports market for some time. Second, large entry costs imply that 
there is a set of firms that remain focused on the domestic market even though they 
are internationally competitive. By reducing or eliminating the entry costs, these firms 
will get access to a larger market.  32
  The second factor that determines whether a firm will export is its cost 
efficiency. Clerides et al. (1998) derive a model where exporting is associated with a 
fixed cost, incurred in every period of exporting. The authors show that, in this model, 
firms with marginal costs below some threshold choose to export, while firms with 
marginal costs above the threshold remain focused on the domestic market. Thus, this 
model predicts that relatively efficient firms will self-select into the export market. A 
number of studies have tested for self-selection based on data from both developed 
and developing countries. On balance, these papers present quite strong evidence that 
efficient firms do indeed self-select into the export market.  
The paper by Bigsten et al. (2004) analyzes whether there is any evidence of 
self-selection into exports markets. They find this effect to be relatively weak. Van 
Biesebroeck (2005a) finds a somewhat stronger self-selection effect on a larger 
sample. Both studies report results suggesting that causality runs in the other 
direction, i.e. from exporting to efficiency. We discuss this next. 
The fact that exporters tend to be more productive than non-exporters is a 
well-known result that seems to hold both in rich and poor countries. Mengistae and 
Pattillo (2004) report a positive correlation between productivity and exporting among 
firms in Ethiopia, Ghana and Kenya. The question of whether this is because 
exporting actually causes efficiency gains has received a lot of attention in the recent 
literature. From a policy perspective, whether or not firms in developing countries can 
“learn” from exporting is an important issue. As we have seen, the domestic markets 
for manufactures are typically very small in Africa, so industrialization will partly 
have to be through exports. Under learning-by-exporting the competitiveness gap can 
be reduced endogenously through increased international trade. As discussed in the 
previous paragraph, one methodological challenge in testing for learning-by-exporting 
effects is that causality may run in the other direction, i.e. efficient firms may self-
select into the export market. Therefore, efficiency and exports may be correlated 
even in the absence of learning effects. Clerides et al. (1998) propose an econometric 
framework that can be used to tease out the relative importance of learning effects and 
self-selection effects. Using this framework, Bigsten et al. (2004) find relatively 
strong evidence of learning effects, in the sense that participating in the exports 
market has positive effects on total factor productivity in subsequent periods. Van 
Biesebroeck (2005a) uses similar methods and obtains results that confirm evidence 
of learning effects.   33
Two further points relating to the Bigsten et al. (2004) paper are worth 
stressing. The first is that the finding that firms seem to learn from exporting is not the 
typical finding in studies looking at this issue for other regions. One possible 
explanation is that the potential gains from exporting are large in Africa because of 
high trade restrictions in the past and a large technological gap to developed countries. 
In such economies exporting offers the maximum scope for the increased discipline of 
competition, and contact with foreign customers provides the maximum scope for 
learning opportunities. Arguably, if exporting induces efficiency in any environment, 
it should do so in these economies. The second point is that a productivity gain of 7-8 
percent in an output production function corresponds to productivity gains in terms of 
value-added of 20-25 percent in the short run and up to 50 percent in the long run. 
These estimates are in line with the results reported by Van Biesebroeck (2005a). The 
quantitative effect of exporting, thus, is far from negligible.  
 
Box 2: Macroeconomic Policy Reforms in Cameroon 
 
In 1994 Cameroon implemented major policy reforms which included tariff reduction and 
rationalization, increased domestic taxes as well as attempts to reduced corruption and 
evasion. Gauthier, Soloaga, and Tybout (2002) use data for Cameroon on prices and 
quantities of the firms’ major inputs and output to compute the effects of tariff changes and 
tax reforms. Before the reforms that tariff structure was highly diversified with rates ranging 
from 0 to 500 percent. The structure encouraged evasion and stimulated attempts to get 
special treatment by authorities. This case-by-case treatment was hardly beneficial for 
efficiency. With the reform more than half the firms lost their privileges after 1992/93. For 
firms operating under the normal regime, though, average customs rate fell from 66.8 percent 
in 1992/93 20.2 percent in 1994/95. This means that in the case of Cameroon was a leveling 
of the playing field, which would tend to improve resource allocation in the economy. 
The average effect of the reforms was to drive up the unit cost per unit of revenue by 
8 percent. This was mainly due to the fact that tariff reductions on outputs fell faster than the 
protection rates on inputs. The impact varied quite a lot across firms, and the signals thus 
differed across categories. In the decomposition of the various effects it actually turns out that 
productivity gains reduced unit costs by as much as 8.5 percent. The average nominal tariff 
rate fell from 68 percent to 27 percent. It is also shown that exporters did much better than 




4.  Policy Implications and Priorities  
We believe the manufacturing sector can contribute to the reversal of Africa’s poor 
economic performance. In this section we outline what, in view of what we have 
learned from the firm surveys, we think must be done in order to maximize the 
likelihood of this happening. A necessary condition for such a strategy to be 
successful is that it is firmly based on the current reality. This is where we begin. 
Industrial development in the world in recent years has been characterized by 
a rapid globalization of production, facilitated by liberalization of international 
economic relations and changes in the nature of corporate activity and international 
investment. Production systems have become increasingly integrated across national 
borders. Firms world-wide have been exposed to increased competitive pressure and 
in large parts of the world production and international trade have grown rapidly. In 
many ways, this is a new global reality for Africa’s manufacturing firms who not long 
ago were protected from international competitive pressure. On the domestic scene, 
the state of the business environment is still very much a legacy of those past times 
when being efficient and internationally competitive was not all that important. Poor 
infrastructure and high utility costs hold back competitive production and drive up 
costs, thus undermining the potential for output expansion. Excessive regulations 
result in entrepreneurs forming very small and informal firms rather than formal 
organizations that have export potential and contribute to tax revenues. The fact that 
key market institutions - such as laws, courts, business associations, lobbies, quality 
control, protection of property rights and enforcement of contracts – are 
underdeveloped means that personal relationships play a central role when firms make 
their output and input decisions, which hampers market integration.  
In this reality, African policy makers face a choice between three broad 
alternatives. The first is to revert to essentially isolationist policies that protect the 
industrial sector from international competition and encourage supply to the domestic 
market. Such policies have been widely implemented in Africa in the past without any 
obvious success, and we can see no reason why they would yield better results this 
time around. The second option is status quo. So far, Africa has failed to take 
advantage of the new opportunities arising from the globalization of production. This 
is partly because the process of liberalization and opening-up has been slower and less 
pervasive in Africa than in other regions, but also because key elements of the  35
investment climate in Africa are simply not good enough. Foreign firms deciding to 
outsource part of their production face a trade off between lower costs of production 
and increasing time costs, transport costs, and coordination costs generally. With poor 
infrastructures, cumbersome bureaucratic practices, poor supporting services or even 
corruption, outsourcing to Africa will be associated with high costs. Clearly under 
status quo where nothing is done about these problems, Africa will continue to 
experience a large amount of missed opportunities. It is hard to see how such a 
strategy can yield growth and create jobs on a scale necessary for significant poverty 
reduction.  
The third broad policy option is to create incentives for African firms to strive 
to participate and be competitive in international markets. In our view, this is the most 
likely route to better economic performance. This view is directly supported by some 
of the findings based on the firm data. Harding, Söderbom and Teal (2004) find that 
the strongest explanatory factor of productivity growth over five years among firms in 
Ghana, Kenya and Tanzania, is the competitive pressure faced by the firms. Firms that 
face little competitive pressure, and have high profits as a result, record slower 
subsequent productivity growth than firms that face a lot of competitive pressure. 
Thus, opting to embrace, rather than to shy away from, increased competition is likely 
to improve the performance of manufacturing firms in Africa. Secondly, as discussed 
in Section 3.5, there is relatively strong evidence that participation in exports markets 
is a source of improved firm performance. We do not yet understand fully why this is 
so – it could be that international competition “disciplines” firms to get better 
organized and become more efficient, or that contacts with firms and customers in 
developed countries help to speed up the rate of technology transfer. Nevertheless, we 
know from the data that these positive effects exist. Apart from the productivity 
effect, international trade leads to concentration of investments in the more efficient 
sectors according to comparative advantages as well as the exploitation of scale 
advantages.  
While the rewards to participation in international markets may be significant, 
pursuing such a strategy also puts big demands on both firms and governments in 
Africa. Without more investment in modern technology and without a drastically 
improved business environment, we cannot see how African firms will be able to 
compete internationally on anything but a very modest scale. Results will not come  36
over night, but to get started a wide range of reforms are needed. Key policy steps, in 
our view, are as follows. 
First, governments must for an extended period of time pursue a 
macroeconomic policy that is both sound and credible to domestic and international 
investors. The whole issue of governance is central, because if governance is poor, 
uncertainty will persist and investors’ response to other initiatives will be weak. We 
know from the firm data that uncertainty is a major factor in explaining why 
investment among African manufacturing firms has been low over the last decade. 
Reducing the uncertainty related to movements in the exchange rate and pursuing 
credible export programs is of course important to promote exports. Overall, the 
government needs to string together several years of good governance and good 
policies. This can be hard in a situation where people do not see quick results, and 
resisting policy reversals and populist policies will therefore be a challenge.  
Second, scarce resources – land, skills, physical capital, raw material - must be 
channeled towards firms that are productive and in good position to export. One 
important issue is what to do with the now very large informal manufacturing sector 
in Africa. Two types of policy measures are conceivable here. The first involves 
designing policies purporting to encourage informal firms to grow and become 
formal. From the firm data we have some indications of how policy makers can best 
facilitate a transition process. Based on Kenyan firm data, Bigsten, Kimuyu and 
Lundvall (2004) argue that the informal sector is large primarily because being formal 
is costly. Formal firms in Kenya have experienced big problems in dealing with 
authorities relating to regulatory red tape, corruption, and lack of security. Informal 
firms, by and large, sidestep these problems, and so incur lower costs. Thus, 
addressing the basic governance and investment climate issues would be a step in the 
right direction as far as trying to encourage entrepreneurs to operate within the realm 
of the formal sector instead of outside it. The second type of policy is oriented 
towards facilitating good performance by informal firms within their current informal 
environment. Importantly, we know from the firm data that some of the key economic 
fundamentals, e.g. total factor productivity, in informal firms are relatively good 
(Bigsten, Kimuyu and Lundvall, 2004). However, capacity-building efforts have so 
far largely neglected the needs of informal firms, while formal firms have been the 
primary beneficiary of policies in areas such as vocational training. One likely welfare 
loss stems from the lack of access to credit, and hence foregone investment, for  37
informal firms, which is due to their ambiguous legal status, lack of proper accounts, 
and the lack of credit-rating procedures relevant to informal firms. Because of the 
small absolute size of the loans required by informal firms, it should be feasible to 
support alternative procedures for the provision of credit.  
Third, putting the emphasis on exports requires significant improvements in 
the investment climate. With poor infrastructure and a weak regulatory system, Africa 
is at a disadvantage in this context, and reforms are urgently needed. Not all reforms 
may be required at once, however, and focusing growth efforts on a specific sector or 
location can save money. There is clear-cut evidence that sound economic policies 
make a difference. In Madagascar, for instance, the creation of an efficient export 
processing zone led to a very rapid expansion in the textiles and garment sector, and 
in Mauritius the investment climate played a major part in transforming the economy 
i n  le ss  t ha n 2 0  ye a r s .  I n  som e  ca se s ,  ac ce s s to  f i rm - l e vel  p a ne l  dat a  h a s  m ade  i t 
possible to measure the effects of macro policies on different types of firms with 
greater precision than what has been possible with aggregate data. Gauthier, Soloaga 
and Tybout (2002) provide a case study of the Cameroonian experience, see Box 2.  
The basic point is that Africa must try to take advantage of the existing 
opportunities, and take action where the problems are most acute. We know that 
African manufacturing firms have the potential to perform well. We mentioned in the 
introduction that one of the most striking results that have come out of the work on 
the firm data is that there is large variation in performance within sectors and 
countries. In recent years, while most firms may have experienced limited success, 
some have performed very well. These tend to be exporters. To enable more firms to 
achieve similar levels of performance, the adoption of new technology and orientation 
towards new markets must feature as key components of African industrial policy. 
Policies that provide incentives and means to firms to adopt a scientific strategy are 
likely to result in better performance, provided policies also facilitate exports. 
Countries that cannot break out of the current situation, where most manufacturing 
firms focus on supplying the domestic market with basic and cheap products, are 
unlikely to see a significant expansion of jobs in the sector. In such countries, 
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